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Abstract

With the emergence of high speed networks, software firms have the ability to deploy "software
as a service" and measure resource usage at the level of individual customers. This enables the
implementation of usage-based pricing. We study both fixed and usage-based pricing schemes in a
competitive setting where the firm incurs a transaction cost of monitoring usage if it implements
usage-based pricing. Oﬀering diﬀerent pricing schemes helps to diﬀerentiate the firms and relax
price competition, particularly at higher monitoring costs, even when competing firms oﬀer the
same service quality. However, the low usage customers acquired by oﬀering usage-based pricing
are unable to compensate for the monitoring costs incurred. This implies that managers should be
cautious about implementing usage-based pricing in a competitive setting.
Keywords: Pricing, competitive strategy, game theory, software industry
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Introduction

The rise of high speed networks such as the Internet has led to the rebirth of an old business model
that was once prevalent in the software industry. Back in the days when all computers were huge
and expensive, time-sharing on large IBM mainframes was common practice, so firms implemented
pricing schemes based on resource usage. This business model became less important as computer
hardware got a lot cheaper and faster. However, the recent spread of complex enterprise software
has again increased the costs of software deployment and maintenance. Consequently, software
firms are looking to leverage the existence of high speed networks to deliver "software as a service"
(SaaS). This term is synonymous with past nomenclature such as "Application Service Providers"
(ASPs), "on-demand computing" (popularized by IBM) and "utility computing". Each of these
terms essentially refers to a business model where a software vendor "develops a web-native software
application and hosts and operates (either independently or through a third-party) the application
for use by its customers over the Internet"1 .
The "software as a service" business model lends itself to many pricing and contracting mechanisms. First of all, the length of a software license has significantly decreased. For example, many
Application Service Providers such as Salesforce.com oﬀer a monthly license. The ability to oﬀer
a short license for a software service is typically termed as "subscription pricing". This is diﬀerent
from selling the software product which typically involves a contract that is valid forever or at least
a significantly long period of time. Subscription pricing may or may not be usage-based. In this
paper, we restrict attention to evaluating the diﬀerence between usage-based pricing and fixed pricing over a single time period while assuming that the nature of the license is a subscription. Many
ASPs have embraced subscription pricing but have not necessarily adopted usage-based pricing. A
prominent example is Salesforce.com in the CRM space. In our paper, this is an example of a firm
oﬀering a fixed price (or flat fee) for unlimited usage.
The last point of the previous paragraph merits further scrutiny. What factors encourage a firm
to adopt usage-based pricing? Past literature such as MacKie-Mason and Varian(1994) points out
to several advantages. When consumers are heterogeneous in usage propensities, many low usage
consumers may not purchase a fixed price service since the firm may optimally set a price to attract
only the high usage consumers. Thus, oﬀering usage-based pricing enables the acquisition of low
usage consumers. Further, even low usage consumers who might have purchased the fixed price
service would prefer usage-based pricing since these consumers would no longer be subsidizing high
usage consumers. Firms would prefer usage-based pricing because they can potentially extract
complete consumer surplus by charging customers based on their individual usage rather than set a
common fixed price. Setting a common fixed price can either turn away some low usage customers
or allow some high usage customers to gain significant positive surplus. Fixed pricing schemes can
result in moral hazard whereby users can increase their usage after the contract terms are agreed
upon and this could adversely aﬀect the firm, particularly in a capacity constrained environment.
Given these advantages, one would expect to see significant adoption of usage-based pricing in many
industry contexts where users diﬀer in their usage propensities but a firm cannot ex-ante estimate
the usage level of a particular user (even if it knows the usage distribution across consumers).
Indeed, usage-based pricing is quite common among computing infrastructure service providers.
1
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Some notable examples of firms that have pursued such a strategy in this space are IBM, HP and
Jamcracker. However, in the software services space, usage-based pricing is nascent and coexists
with fixed pricing schemes. For example, in the market for live conference software, Microsoft
Live Meeting is oﬀered as a monthly fixed price subscription service while its competitor, Adobe
Acrobat Connect Professional is oﬀered both at fixed prices and at per minute payment plans. In
the project management software space, Microsoft Project Server (widely considered the high end
vendor) is oﬀered at a flat fee while ILOG Gantt for .NET is sold both as a fixed price unlimited
use version as well as a run time based version. However, in the math programming / optimization
space, ILOG Cplex is the high end provider and does not oﬀer usage-based pricing for its web
based service. At the same time, users operating in specific industries can opt for industry-specific
web-based optimization software that is priced based on resource usage. One such example in the
transportation industry is routesmith.com (used for optimizing fleet assignment and routing). In
fact, routesmith.com charges users based on the number of vehicles in their fleet. Thus, in addition
to the wide variation in pricing schemes, one also observes variation in the resource metric used.
Run time is a commonly used metric as seen from the previous examples. InstantService.com, a
web based tool for interacting with online customers, prices based on transactions and defines a
transaction as one chat session or 3 email messages.
What could potentially explain the persistence of fixed price oﬀerings in the software services market
despite the much touted advantages of usage-based pricing? To seek an answer, we need to delve
deeper into the specific characteristics of the software services market. Primarily, we would like to
highlight two aspects of software firms and markets that may not be applicable to a wider variety
of industries:

• The first aspect is that software products and services behave like information goods. Consequently, they display a unique characteristic of information goods as stated in MacKie-Mason
and Varian(1994) and Sundararajan(2004). Administering a usage-based pricing schedule
involves fixed and variable transaction costs. In many industries, these costs are low when
compared to other variable production costs. However, in the context of information goods,
variable costs of production are low. Consequently, when usage-based pricing is introduced,
the monitoring costs appear significant and become especially relevant in designing usagebased pricing schemes for information goods.
• The second aspect is that the software service industry is a form of access industry (industries
in which consumers pay a price based on resource utilization. Examples are gyms, theme
parks, phone lines etc.). In many access industries, usage level alone is not an adequate
measure of willingness to pay. Compare a retired senior citizen with a younger business
executive, both of whom use an online word processing service. Clearly, the business executive
would be willing to pay much more than the senior citizen for one unit of use. However, this
does not reveal anything about the actual level of usage. The senior citizen may use the
service as much as or even more than the business executive over a specific period of time.
Thus, the willingness to pay calculation needs to take into account both the usage level and
the per-use valuation of a consumer.

In this paper we analyze and compare fixed and usage-based pricing schemes in a competitive setting
while incorporating certain factors that are specific to the software services industry. We restrict
2

attention to usage-based schemes that are linear in usage. Although more complex non-linear
usage-based schemes may be appropriate in many settings, linear schemes are easy to implement
and hence commonly used in practice. We also make another assumption since software services are
closely related to the internet service industry; in this industry, a first-order approximation of reality
as stated in Essegaier et al(2002) is: consumer usage rate is more a function of individual usage
propensity than a function of price. What this implies is that while the aggregate demand curve for
the firm displays some price elasticity, an individual consumer’s usage level is inelastic to changes
in per-unit price. The aggregate demand curve is elastic because consumers vary in the value they
attach to a single unit of use and they also vary in their individual usage propensities. Such an
assumption is particularly true in the context of software services used by industrial customers. For
example, the primary users of ILOG Cplex optimization software are either consultants or analytics
departments of large corporations. Such customers of ILOG certainly have to make a decision on
the kind of pricing scheme that they would accept. However, they are unlikely to change their usage
level based on the per unit price because their usage level of the software is determined by their
clients (whether external or internal) and not by them. In addition, the users of software in many
large corporations are not the same people as the managers who make a decision on the pricing
scheme to accept. Hence, actual usage levels are unlikely to change with changes in per unit price.
Our primary findings are as follows. In a duopoly setting with high monitoring cost, oﬀering diﬀerent pricing schemes can help to diﬀerentiate the firms even when the two firms are not diﬀerentiated
in service quality. This occurs because the market segments targeted by the two firms do not completely overlap. However, this diﬀerentiation disappears as monitoring cost decreases to zero. At
all values of the monitoring cost, the firm oﬀering a fixed price makes higher profit than the firm
oﬀering a usage-based price. This implies that although low usage customers are acquired by offering usage-based pricing, the revenue accrued from them in a competitive environment does not
compensate for the monitoring cost incurred. One possible remedy for the harmful competition that
occurs at low monitoring cost is for the firms to diﬀerentiate their oﬀerings such that the firm with
higher service quality oﬀers a fixed price while the other firm oﬀers usage-based pricing. However,
a higher monitoring cost may prove to be a "blessing in disguise" and such quality diﬀerentiation
is not necessary.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature in the area.
Section 3 sets up the basic model. Section 4 details the duopoly setting while Section 5 concludes
the discussion and proposes directions for future research. All proofs are in the appendix.

2

Related Literature

The literature on non-linear pricing has roots in economics via Oi(1971) who shows that a truly
discriminating two part tariﬀ globally maximizes monopoly profits by extracting all consumer surpluses. The Oi model is extended by Schmalensee(1981) who analyzes the case of profit constrained
welfare maximization. Phillips and Battalio(1983) investigate the situation where buyers can substitute between visits and also consumption between visits. Other forms of pricing can also be
mapped into the nonlinear pricing framework, most notably quantity discounts (see Dolan(1987)).
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The literature on nonlinear pricing described above makes some assumptions: there is no transaction
cost to administering a usage-based price, and consumers are homogeneous in their preferences and
usage propensities. The literature described below addresses these issues and studies nonlinear
pricing for a monopoly when these assumptions are relaxed. Maskin and Riley (1984) and Wilson
(1993) look at nonlinear pricing for a monopoly in the context of heterogeneous customer type but
zero transaction costs of usage-based pricing. In this line of work, the firm only knows the customer
type distribution but not the type of any particular individual. Hence, they find that the optimal
pricing scheme is usage-based and is fully revealing. Nahata et al(1999) analyze the optimality
of "buﬀet pricing" (similar to fixed pricing in our model) in a monopoly setting when oﬀering
usage-based pricing involves a transaction cost. However, in his model, consumers do not vary
in their usage levels and they are all equally sensitive to price. Sundararajan (2004) considerably
generalizes previous monopoly models in the context of information goods by using a utility function
satisfying a broad set of properties that incorporates customer preferences and usage heterogeneity.
He shows that oﬀering a combination of usage-based and fixed pricing is optimal and consequently,
this is never fully revealing when usage-monitoring costs are non-zero. However, customers are
represented by only one type.
Although the above literature focusing primarily on monopoly settings has added substantially to
our knowledge, competition is a reality in many markets including the market for software products
and services. Literature on non-linear pricing in the context of competition is sparse. Hayes(1987)
shows that two part tariﬀs act as a form of insurance in environments with uncertainty and hence is
oﬀered by firms even in a competitive setting. Another extension to a competitive setting is by Oren
& Smith(1983) who study nonlinear tariﬀs in the context of symmetric Cournot competition (all
firms oﬀer the same type of tariﬀ). Jain & Kannan(2002) looks at competition between connecttime and search-based pricing. In their model, users diﬀer in their ability to conduct successful
searches. Consequently, the relationship between number of successful searches and connect time
is diﬀerent for diﬀerent consumers. Thus, they examine competition between two diﬀerent forms
of usage-based pricing. In our paper, the definition of usage does not make a distinction between
connect time and search eﬀort since we wish to look at competition between usage-based pricing
and fixed pricing. Some of our results look similar to their work, but that is simply coincidental
given that our competitive setting is quite diﬀerent. Another paper that looks at competition in this
setting is Essegaier et al(2002), which compares two part tariﬀs with fixed pricing and usage-based
pricing for access service industries under conditions of customer heterogeneity and limited capacity.
Customer preference is modeled with a Hotelling model. Individual customer usage is inelastic in
per unit price. They look at competition in addition to monopoly. However, in all of their settings,
low usage customers may be either higher or lower in willingness to pay (WTP) as compared
to high usage customers but not both. Consequently, their model is primarily one of horizontal
diﬀerentiation with some reference to WTP. In our model, all types of customers coexist: 1) low
usage, low WTP 2) low usage, high WTP 3) high usage, low WTP 4) high usage, high WTP. Thus,
to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to address the issue of competition between
usage-based and fixed pricing in the context of vertically diﬀerentiated consumers. Other than
Bashyam(1996), which focuses on a technology choice problem, we are unaware of any other papers
that employ such a model.
In short, our paper adds to the literature on information goods pricing by evaluating the eﬀectiveness of usage-based pricing in a competitive context for the software services industry. The
specific industry context chosen requires the use of a richer model of customer heterogeneity than
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previously seen and also the assumption of a specific cost structure. The results of our analysis
provide insights on some commonly observed pricing practices in the software services industry.

3

Model definition

This section defines the general model and notation. We begin with laying out the customer utility
function.

Customers and service quality: To model the two types of heterogeneity discussed earlier,
each customer is described by a two dimensional vector (α, β) in which α denotes the utility that
the customer will derive from a single use of the service and β represents the frequency with which
the customer will use the service. A scalar U parameterizes the service quality or functionality, so
an “(α, β)-customer” enjoys utility of αβ · U from purchasing the service.
The set of potential customers is modelled as an atomless spread of (α, β) pairs distributed evenly
over the [0, 1] × [0, 1] square. Thus, if M is the size of the potential market, then any market of
size x · M corresponds to a fraction x of the area of this square. To simplify however, the market
is normalized by setting M equal to one; this is just scaling and does not sacrifice generality.
Purchasing decisions follow naturally; customers are assumed to self-select whatever purchasing
option maximizes this utility net of price.

Fixed pricing: Buyers pay a common price Pf , and receive unlimited use of the service. Disregarding any other pricing options, purchasing is worthwhile for an (α, β)-customer if
αβ · U − Pf > 0.

(1)

Figure 1 illustrates. Customers who share the same value of α · β derive the same utility from
the service, so hyperbolae on the unit square become lines of “iso-utility.” These are the curves in
figure 1(a); each iso-utility line is a locus of customers with identical purchasing behavior under
fixed pricing. The Pf price chosen by the firm then segments the customers along one of these
hyperbolae as shown in figure 1(b). In that figure, the boundary between the “do not purchase”
P
segment and the “pay fixed-fee” segment is the curve α · β = Uf .
Usage-based pricing: In this pricing scheme, the customer pays Pu for each use. Since she uses
the service with frequency β, her total payments are β · Pu versus utility of αβU , so this scheme is
worthwhile to her if
β (αU − Pu ) > 0.
Notice that we assume that β does not change with Pu . This is as stated in the introduction.
The self-selection condition is analogous to equation (1) but results in a very diﬀerent structure
as illustrated by figure 2. Iso-utility lines are now vertical, and the firm’s selection of a particular
value of Pu segments the market along α = PUu .
5
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Figure 3: Segmentation for dual-scheme duopoly

Costs and revenues: With fixed pricing, a firm’s profits are Pf times the area above the segmenting hyperbola. With usage-based pricing, revenues accrue on a per-use basis and the firm
additionally incurs costs of cu dollars per-use to cover the costs of metering and monitoring.

Equilibrium: The first stage of this “game” is the pricing decision; customer purchases then
follow. The solution concept employed is a standard Stackelberg Nash equilibrium between the set
of potential customers and the firm or firms supplying the software.

4

Duopoly analysis

We now consider scenarios with competition between two firms whose service oﬀerings are not
diﬀerentiated. We also assume that they are not diﬀerentiated in terms of cost structure. Each
firm incurs a similar transaction cost of monitoring usage. Each firm decides on the appropriate
pricing schedule (whether usage-based or fixed) and then both firms compete by setting prices for
their respective pricing schemes. If both firms oﬀer the same type of pricing scheme, it can be
easily shown that this would result in Bertrand competition where each firm prices at marginal
cost2 . The only remaining case involves one firm that oﬀers fixed pricing and the other that oﬀers
usage-based pricing. As before, both firms oﬀer the same service quality (i.e., both oﬀer the same
U ). Figure 3 illustrates the segmentation that results when both options are oﬀered. The two
pricing mechanisms (firms) compete by truncating the other’s segment along the horizontal line
P
β = Puf — this is the locus of indiﬀerence between the fixed- and usage-based schemes.
2

The proof of this result is straightforward and available with the authors.
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Pf is chosen by the “pay fixed-fee” segment of figure 3, and qf is the size of this segment.
¶
¶
µ ¶
Z 1 µ
Z 1 µ
Pf
Pf
Pf
Pf
Pf
Pf
dα −
dα = 1 −
ln
.
−
+
qf = P 1 −
f
Pu
αU
Pu αU
Pu
U
Pu
U

U

Pu is chosen by the “pay usage-fee” segment, and the number of times this segment uses the software
service is:
Pf

Z1 ZPu

Pu
U

β dβ dα

µ

=

0

Pf
Pu

¶2 µ

Pu
1
−
2 2U

¶

The profit functions for the two firms are:
Fixed price firm:
πf =

(

Pf · (1 −

Pf2
Pf
Pu ) + U

0

ln

³

Pf
Pu

´

if Pf < Pu

(2)

otherwise

Usage-based pricing firm:
πu =

(

1
2
1
2

· (Pu − cu ) · (1 −
· (Pu − cu ) · (1 −

Pu
U )·
Pu
U )}

³

Pf
Pu

´2

if Pu > Pf

(3)

otherwise

An equilibrium is a (Pu , Pf ) pair that simultaneously satisfies the firms’ respective objectives:
max{πu } and max{πf }
Pu

Pf

The following two lemmas outline some technical results and characterize the “best response” prices
and are used to develop the equilibrium results given in the immediately following proposition.

Lemma 1 If a non-negative function g has g (a) = g (b) = 0 and g 000 > 0. Then, on the interval
(a, b), the function g has a maximum and no (other) local maxima.

Lemma 2 At equilibrium:
(i) For any usage-based price Pu , the fixed price firm selects a strictly lower price
(ii) For any fixed price Pf , the usage-fee firm selects:
⎧
2cU
if Pf < 2cU
⎪
⎨ 1+c
1+c
Pu =
Pf
if 2cU
≤
Pf ≤
1+c
⎪
⎩ (1+c)U
(1+c)U
if Pf > 2
2

(1+c)U
2

Result i) ensures that the fixed-pricing firm gets at least one customer. A combination of results
i) and ii) along with lemma 1 help derive the equilibrium pricing strategy. This is detailed in the
next proposition.
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Proposition 1 (i) There exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies.
At equilibrium,
(ii) Pu∗ =

2cU
1+c

(iii) The fixed-price firm always makes higher profit than the usage-based pricing firm for all nonzero values of the monitoring cost.
(iv) Fixed-price profit increases with the monitoring cost.
(v) There exists an interval bounded below by c = 0 for which the usage-fee profit increases with the
monitoring cost.
(vi) There exists an interval bounded above by c = 1 for which the usage-fee profit decreases with
the monitoring cost.
(vii) In the limit as monitoring cost approaches zero: the market is fully covered, each firm gets
exactly half of the market, and πf = πu = 0.

Noting that the firms compete through price-setting and that the firms’ service qualities are identical, one might expect to see the “Bertrand result” that the firms are unprofitable at equilibrium.
It is thus interesting to observe that both firms’ equilibrium profits are actually strictly positive
in this model (for all c ∈ (0, 1)). The key here is that the Bertrand result depends on a complete
lack of diﬀerentiation. In this duopoly however, the fact that the two firms oﬀer diﬀerent pricing
schemes provides a form of diﬀerentiation that results in a profitable equilibrium. This occurs because the target customer segments of the two diﬀerent pricing schemes do not completely overlap.
This fact is illustrated visually by the diﬀerent shapes of the market segments that result from the
two pricing schemes. Result (iii) reveals an additional insight however. Although the firms are
not diﬀerentiated in service oﬀerings, the fixed pricing firm makes higher profit. This result is not
ex-ante obvious because although the usage-based pricing scheme incurs a cost not incurred by the
fixed pricing scheme, it also has the ability to attract several low usage consumers. It is this very
fact that enables a monopoly firm to prefer usage-based pricing over fixed pricing at low monitoring
costs3 . However, in a competitive setting, the revenue generated by the low usage consumers who
are acquired cannot compensate for the monitoring cost incurred. Consequently, the usage-based
pricing firm always makes lower profit. This formalizes the insight that usage-based pricing, though
valuable in a monopoly setting with low monitoring costs, is highly sensitive to competition from
a fixed pricing scheme.
Equilibrium results for the dual-fee duopoly are illustrated in figure 4. A notable feature is that
the usage-fee firm’s profit is significantly lower than that of the fixed-fee firm. Further, usage-fee
profits (πu ) are non-monotonic in the monitoring cost c (as opposed to what would be expected
for a usage-fee monopolist). Rather, that firm’s profits first increase and then decrease with c (as
anticipated by proposition 1(v) and (vi)). The fact that πu can increase as its costs increase is
3

The proof of this result is straightforward and is available with the authors.
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Figure 4: Competitor’s profits: dual scheme duopoly

somewhat surprising, but it has a straightforward explanation — the increase in c has the eﬀect of
reducing the degree of competition between the two firms, and this is beneficial to both competitors.
This does not continue indefinitely however; for c greater than about 0.2 the negative eﬀects of
increasing c dominates and πu begins to fall. As c gets large, πu disappears and the fixed pricing firm
becomes essentially a monopolist. An analogous result is developed in Jain & Kannan(2002) but in
a competitive setting where the firms oﬀer either connect-time based or search-based pricing. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to highlight this result in the context of competition
between a firm oﬀering a fixed price and a firm oﬀering a usage-fee.
While this numerical study reveals important details, a broader conclusion emerges regarding the
usage-based pricing scheme. While the usage-based pricing scheme is optimal for a monopoly firm
at low monitoring cost, it is highly sensitive to competition against a fixed pricing competitor. At
the same time, a diversity of pricing schemes can help to diﬀerentiate firms if the service oﬀerings
are not significantly diﬀerentiated. However, such diﬀerentiation disappears when the monitoring
cost decreases to zero. Consequently, firms would have to diﬀerentiate their oﬀerings in the context
of low monitoring costs4 . However, a higher monitoring cost may prove to be a "blessing in disguise"
and such quality diﬀerentiation is not necessary.

5

Concluding Remarks

The rise of the "software as a service" business model has led to the rebirth of usage-based pricing. However, usage alone is not an adequate measure of the willingness to pay for consumers of
software services. Consumers vary in the value they derive with the same amount of use. In ad4

An analysis of competition between diﬀerentiated software service providers is available with the authors.
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dition, firms that implement usage-based pricing incur a monitoring cost. Given a choice between
fixed and usage-based pricing schemes, a monopolist would find usage-based pricing to be optimal
at low monitoring costs and a fixed price at higher monitoring costs. We study a competitive
setting where consumers oﬀer the same service oﬀering but can potentially oﬀer diﬀerent pricing
mechanisms(usage-based versus fixed pricing). When monitoring costs are high, we find that oﬀering diﬀerent pricing schemes enables firms to diﬀerentiate themselves purely on the basis of pricing
mechanisms even when their service quality values are not diﬀerent. This occurs because the two
pricing schemes target customers who do not completely overlap. However, when firms compete
with diﬀerent pricing schemes, lower monitoring cost leads to intense price competition. An increase in monitoring cost relieves price competition and benefits both firms. This result overturns
the monopoly result where lower monitoring cost is always better. Another insight is that the fixed
pricing firm always makes higher profits than the usage-based pricing firm despite the fact that
both firms oﬀer the same service quality. This occurs because the revenue accrued from low usage
customers by deploying usage-based pricing in a competitive setting does not compensate for the
monitoring cost incurred. This reveals that the usage-based pricing scheme is highly sensitive to
competition, specifically when the competitor oﬀers a fixed price. These results serve to explain
the persistence of fixed pricing in the software services industry. In a duopoly scenario with high
monitoring costs, firms do better when they diﬀerentiate their pricing schemes even in the absence
of service diﬀerentiation, thus allowing some firms to persist with fixed pricing. Hence the much
touted notion of "usage-based pricing" may not be a panacea for software service providers.
As always, our results are limited by our assumptions. One of our assumptions is that both
usage level and utility per use of customers is uniformly distributed. To evaluate the impact of
a non-uniform distribution, we observe that the usage-based pricing firm acquires customers who
have lower levels of usage but higher levels of utility per unit of usage. Thus, if the distribution of
customers over the unit square has higher density over the low usage - high utility per use quadrant,
then the number of customers (and consequent revenue) acquired by the usage-based pricing firm
in a competitive setting could oﬀset the monitoring cost incurred. Another possibility that we
do not consider is that users may be uncertain about their own levels of use and the choice of
pricing schemes is frequently aﬀected by such uncertainty. However, uncertainty in terms of usage
frequency merely reinforces the vulnerability of usage-based pricing. When usage level is uncertain
and customers are risk averse, they are more likely to opt for the flat/fixed pricing schemes, thus
negatively impacting usage-based pricing. Thus our key result is likely to be reinforced with such
a setting. Further research might seek to address such issues and also focus on empirical validation
of some of our key research findings.
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Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
First, it must be that g is concave-convex on [a, b].5 That is, there is a value c such that g is
strictly concave over subinterval [a, c) and strictly convex over (c, b]. To see this: (1) g must be
strictly concave at a — otherwise, g 000 > 0 would imply that g is strictly convex everywhere, and
this would make g (a) = g (b) = 0 impossible. (2) g 000 > 0 implies that if g is convex at c then g is
strictly convex over all (c, b]. Next, g must have exactly one point in (a, b) at which g 0 = 0. This
is seen by contradiction: assume g 0 (x) = g 0 (y) = 0 for some x < y in (a, b). Then, (because g is
concave-convex) g must be concave at x, convex at y, and increasing between y and b. This then
implies that g (y) < g (b) which together with g (b) = 0 contradicts the premise of nonnegative g.
Finally, the strict concavity of g over (a, c) together with g = 0 at endpoints a and b implies that
the unique inflection point must be a maximum.
Proof of lemma 2:
5

Although the convex portion may be empty.
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(i) (by contradiction): If Pf ≥ Pu then: (1) For every (α, β)-customer, the utility αβU − Pf derived
from the fixed price option is ≤ β (αU − Pu ), the utility derived from the usage-fee option (because
β ≤ 1). (2) Thus, qf , sales by the fixed price firm are 0. (3) But, the continuity of πf guarantees
that the fixed price firm can always find a price that will supply strictly positive profits. (4) Thus, a
(Pu , Pf ) pair with Pf ≥ Pu violates this fixed firm’s optimality criterion. Hence at optimal pricing
for the fixed price firm, we have Pf < Pu
(ii) To simplify the analysis, let: πu0 =

πu
U ,

pf =

Pf
U ,

pu =

Pu
U

and c =

cu
U

:

The profit function of the usage-fee firm in equation (3) becomes:
( (p −c)·(1−p )·p2
u
u
f
if pu > pf
2
0
2·p
u
πu =
(pu −c)·(1−pu )
otherwise
2

(4)

Diﬀerentiating the first line of the profit function in equation (4) with respect to pu :
¶ 2
µ
∂πu0
1
2c
c pf
= − 2 + 3 − 2
∂pu
pu pu pu 2
µ
¶ 2
pf
∂ 2 πu0
6c
= 2−
+ 2c
2
∂pu
pu
2p3u
2 0

2c
3c
Setting the first derivative to zero, we get p∗u (pf ) = 1+c
. Now ∂∂pπ2u ≤ 0 for pu ∈ [0, 1+c
] and
u
3c
0
0
> 0 for pu ∈ ( 1+c , 1] implying that πu is concave-convex in pu . Also, at pu = c, πu = 0 and
0
∂πu
∂pu

p2

= − (1 − c) 2f ≤ 0 at pu = 1 implying that the function is strictly concave with zero value
at the lower limit of the domain and strictly convex decreasing at the upper limit of the domain.
Combining the above facts implies strict quasi-concavity of the objective function over the given
2c
, the
domain. Setting the first derivative equal to zero provides a unique maximum. If pf < 1+c
2c
2c
∗
best response pu (pf ) = 1+c > pf . If pf ≥ 1+c , then the quasi-concavity of the profit function
dictates that p∗u (pf ) = pf . Diﬀerentiating the second line of the profit function in equation 3, we
1+c
1+c
∗
∗
find the optimal usage-fee to be p∗u (pf ) = 1+c
2 . If pf ≤ 2 , then pu (pf ) = 2 else pu (pf ) = pf .
Combining the results above, the best response usage-fee for the entire range of fixed prices can be
constructed as stated in the lemma.

Proof of proposition 1: (i) Using lemma 2, we can restrict analysis to the case where pf < pu .
π
P
Similar to previous part of the proof, we set πf0 = Uf , pf = Uf , and pu = PUu . The first line of the
profit function of the fixed price firm from equation (2) is simplified to give:
µ ¶
pf
pf
0
2
(5)
πf = pf · (1 − ) + pf ln
pu
pu
with:

∂πf0

2pf
= 1 + pf −
+ 2pf ln
∂pf
pu

and:

∂ 2 πf0
∂p2f

2
=3−
+ 2 ln
pu
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µ

µ

pf
pu

pf
pu

¶

¶

(6)

∂ 3 πf0
∂p3f

=

2
>0
pf

Using this fact about the third derivative and that πf = 0 at the endpoints pf = 0 and pf = pu ,
lemma 1 provides the result that there exists a unique fixed price response to any usage-fee. From
the earlier part of this proof, we know that when pf < pu , the usage-fee firm has a unique response
pu = 2cU
1+c . Since there is a unique fixed price response to this price, the resulting unique set of
prices maximizes the profit of both firms given the strategy of the competitor and hence constitutes
an equilibrium in pure strategies. Let this price pair be denoted by (pef , peu ).We show uniqueness
of this equilibrium by contradiction: suppose that (p0f , p0u ) represents an equilibrium price pair in
2c
addition to the price pair (pef , peu ). By lemma 2, p0f < p0u resulting in p0u = 1+c
which equals peu .
From the earlier part of this proposition, there is a unique fixed price response to this price. Hence
p0f = pef . Hence (p0f , p0u ) = (pef , peu ) and the equilibrium is unique.
(ii) Follows from i)
(iii) At equilibrium we know that the first derivative of the profit function for the fixed price firm
should be zero. Using the expression for this first derivative from equation (6) and applying this
condition:
µ ¶
2pf
pf
=0
+ 2pf ln
1 + pf −
pu
pu
Rearranging this:
pf ln

µ

pf
pu

¶

=

µ

1 + pf
2

¶

−

pf
pu

Substituting for the lhs of the above equation in the profit function given by equation (5), we get:
¶¶
µ
¶
µ
µ
pf
pf
1 + pf
+ pf
−
πf = pf 1 −
pu
pu
2
pf (1 − pf )
=
2
Comparing firm profits at equilibrium, we get πf > πu only if:
pf (1 − pf )
1
> (pu − c)(1 − pu )
2
2
Simplifying the above equation and using the fact that pu =
pf <

4c
=
(1 + c)2

µ

2
1+c

¶µ

µ

pf
pu

¶2

2c
1+c :

2c
1+c

¶

Observe that, at equilibrium:
pf < pu ≤

µ

2
1+c

¶

pu =

Thus, we must have πf > πu at equilibrium.
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µ

2
1+c

¶µ

2c
1+c

¶

(iv) The fixed-price firm’s modified profit function is given by equation (5). This profit is an
increasing function of the usage-fee as shown by direct diﬀerentiation:
∂πf0
∂pu

=

p2f
pu

µ

¶
1
−1 >0
pu

This is true for every pu , so it is also true for the equilibrium pu . Also, c does not appear in the
fixed-price firm’s profit function. This implies that the fixed-price firm’s equilibrium profit increases
if and only if the equilibrium pu increases with c. By inspection of lemma 2, we find that it does.
(v) & (vi) Let πu∗ (c) represent the equilibrium profit for the firm oﬀering the usage-fee at optimal
prices as a function of the monitoring cost. p∗u < 1 implies that customers will purchase a strictly
positive number of usage-fee transactions, and p∗u > c implies that these transactions are profitable.
Thus, πu∗ (c) > 0 whenever 0 < c < 1. The stated results are then implied by the continuity of πu∗
in c (which can be verified by the implicit function theorem).
(vii) At equilibrium prices, the first derivative of the fixed price firm’s profit (c.f. equation 5) as a
function of price must be zero. That is:
∂πf0
∂pf

= 1 + pf − 2

pf
pf
+ 2pf ln( ) = 0
pu
pu

where pf and pu are the equilibrium prices. Taking the limit of the above equation as c → 0 gives:
1 + lim pf − 2 · L + 2 · lim pf · ln(L) = 0
c→0

c→0

³

´
p
where L = limc→0 puf . We know that at equilibrium, 0 < pf < pu . However, limc→0 pu = 0
(using the closed form expression of pu ). Taking limits on both sides of the inequality, we have
limc→0 pf = 0. Using this in the above equation:
1−2·L=0
µ ¶
pf
1
=
lim
c→0 pu
2
which is the same as:
lim

c→0

µ

Pf
Pu

¶

=

1
2
p

At c → 0, we have both prices: pu → 0 and pf → 0. At zero prices, the market is fully covered. puf
p
is the line of indiﬀerence between the two segments and puf → 12 as c → 0. Hence each firm gets
exactly half of the potential market.
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